Banknotes carry traces from both histories and policies of states. This study deals with the banknotes issued in 1980 to today and claims that these banknotes have had political messages. In this respect, Turkish-Islamic Synthesis and its symbolization of banknotes is the main point of this study. TurkishIslamic Synthesis emerged in the 1960s and evolved to a state policy after the military coup in 1980. It still exists under AKP rule in the 2000s. This maintenance can be traced in design of the banknotes, which issued during military coup period and continued during AKP rule.
Introduction
In the last decade, it is argued that there is a struggle between those who would like to see Turkey more aligned with the Islamic world and those who want it to remain more secular and 'Western' (Friedman, 2010 cited in Orhan, 2013 . In relation to this argument, a debate on national identity -whether it is based on nationalism or religionemerges. As Waxman (2000, p. 2) asks: Do Turks see themselves as members of the West or East? As Europeans or Middle Eastemers? As Turks first, or Muslims first? What place does religion and ethnicity have in Turkish national identity?
It may be said that roots and answers of this debate have its origins in the past century.
According to this debate, there is a historical contradiction between nationalism and religion. Moreover, Islam and nationalism are not reconcilable issues in terms of political and social levels (Grigoriadis, 2013, p. 71) . These two concepts are argued of being incompatible. Especially after secular politics of the early Republican Period, religion has been perceived as the cause of backwardness and as an obstacle for Westernization. Thus, it is claimed that religion is excluded from both political and social spheres of life. However, there is no distinct contradiction between religion and nationalism. Despite the claims that rise of one is decline of the other, relationship between Islam and nationalism is not a zero sum game. On the contrary, there is a dynamic interaction between them. There is a dual process involving the Islamization of Turkish nationalism, and the nationalization of Islam (Waxman, 2000, p. 5) . From the late 1860s until today, religion has become a significant component of nationalism and national identity in Turkey. Gökhan Çetinsaya (1999, p. 351) explains the interaction with a threefold sense:
One is Turkishness and Islam has been closely linked from the very beginning throughout the evolution of Turkish nationalism and modernist Islam. Second is that who rejected Islam among the Turkists and that who rejected nationalism among the Islamists were the exceptions and did not present the majority. Third is that people, who adapt Turkish-Islamic Synthesis among the Islamists and Turkists in present day Turkey, are influenced by same resources published between the 1950s and the 1970s.
When the 1970s and the 1980s came, interaction between religion and nationalism became a de facto state policy, which is called as Turkish-Islamic Synthesis (TIS), and it lasts up to today under Justice and Development Party (AKP) rule.
In the conjuncture of Cold War politics, TIS aimed to create a national identity based on ethnicity and religion against the rising left (Yavuz, 2003, 38) . According to Orhan (2013, p. 32) , this acquired overtones of religious nationalism, a blending of ethnic (Turk) and religious (Sunni Islam).
It is such a significant issue that this synthesis influenced not only the political and social life but also the symbols used in daily life. Banknotes, as one of the most used symbolic instruments in daily life, involves traces of political transitions and state policies.
In this article, continuity of interaction between religion and nationalism will be studied. While doing this, TIS and the banknotes used during the years of military coup in 1980 and the banknotes issued during AKP rule in 2009 will be the focal points. In this respect, this study will be composed of three parts. In the first part, TIS will be explained, the emergence and roots of this project will be tackled. In the second part, continuity of TIS since military coup in 1980 to AKP years in the 2000s will be analyzed.
In this part, influence of synthesis in relation to political parties will be discussed. In the last part, roles of banknotes as instruments of political transition and state policies will be discussed. Banknotes used in the early 1980s and banknotes issued in 2009, when the AKP consolidated its power, will be analyzed with reference to TIS.
Turkish Islamic Synthesis
Strengthening of Islam in Turkish politics was partly a consequence of changes in the international system, and, related to this, Turkish right deemed Islam as an asset to tap into after the dawn of the Cold War and the looming of communism (Aslan, 2014, p. 523) . Rise of leftist movements was perceived as a threat to sovereignty, national identity and territorial integrity of Turkey, and this resulted in seizing of power by the Turkish Army in 1980. The policies of military government about the national identity was based on the convergence of Turkish nationalism and Islam, which were crystallized in the concept of TIS (Orhan, 2013, p. 40) . 1, 2 It was originally formulated by right-wing intellectuals including İsmail Dayı, Necmettin Erbakan and Agah Oktay Güner, who were members of the Thinkers Club (Aydınlar Kulübü) (Atasoy, 2009, p. 94) . Then, this club was converted to The Hearth of the Enlightened (Aydınlar Ocağı) which was formed in 1970 (Waxman, 2000, p. 18) .
Concerned of increasing influence of leftist movements, right-wing intellectuals highlighted a religion-inspired nationalism. Religion was defined as the core principle of social and cultural life. It was İbrahim Kafesoğlu, who ideologized interrelation of religion, nationalism and modernity within Turkish context. In this regard, Islam was defined as the most suitable religion for Turks and the TIS as a component of national identity.
Bearing in mind that universities were the center of leftist movements, education was defined as the core of TIS. Governments formed through leading of military regime, referred to religion and religious education as unifying factors to consolidate the nation. In this point, it should be noted that religious education was formed and controlled by the state. It was the 'official Islam', rather than the fundamentalist or reactionary ones (Waxman, 2000, p. 19) . In this regard, Çetinsaya (1999, p. 370 (Zubeida, 1996) . Number of these schools increased tremendously from the late 1960s to the early 1990s (Zubeida, 1996) . A typical imamhatip student read Mehmet Akif, Ziya Gökalp, Yahya Kemal, Necip Fazıl and Peyami Safa, apart from standard religious and other textbooks (Çetinsaya, 1999, p. 370) .
Playing a crucial role in evolution of TIS, many leading figures in Turkey were graduates of imam-hatip schools including National View Movement and AKP (Şen, 2011, p. 64 (Uzer, 2011, p. 51) . Due to the influence of leftist movements, it is clear that campaigns and ideas of nationalist parties have changed. Islam became one of the core elements of nationalism (Bora, 2003, p. 445-6) . For instance, Islam was not emphasized in 'Nine Lights' As a result of Islam's gradual infiltration to the state, more Islamically-oriented elite entered to the higher echelons of government, economy, and culture, and they influenced not only state policies, but also the articulation of Turkish national identity (Waxman, 2000, p. 16) . In 1983, the State Planning Organization prepared a report stating that the corruption of Turkish moral and cultural values were caused by 'divisive foreign ideologies', and resulted in internal disorder (Atasoy, 2009, p. 93) .
Moreover, it is alleged that secular nationalism caused the removal of Islam, which constituted cultural links between Kurds and Turks. Therefore, separatist movement among Kurds increased (Atasoy, 2009, p. 96) and leftist movements rose. It was duty of the state to protect national culture against foreign ideologies and empower the national unity. Islam was referred as a consolidative factor. As a result, Ottoman and Islamic legacy rather than the republican one was pointed as the main component of national identity. According to Atasoy (2009, p. 96) (Turam, 2007, p. 49) . Turgut Özal played an important role in intersection of TIS and neoliberalism. …Özal united and symbolized the main features of both neoliberalism and Turkish Islamism…the Motherland Party under his leadership was committed to the authoritarian policies of the military regime, enthusiastically pursued strong neoliberal policies, promoted religiousconservative values in politics and culture, and enlarged the religious field (Şen, 2011, p. 67) .
Under Motherland Party rule, the network of imam-hatips was again expanded, their curriculum changed to include inculcation of the TIS, and the mosque building programme was continued (Hale and Özbudun, 2010, p. xxi) . Özal was epitomizing the synthesis of religion and nationalism. As a right-wing politician, he defined Islam as an essential element of Turkish identity:
What holds together, or rather brings together, our unity and our cohesiveness is the fact that we are all citizens of the Turkish Republic. This is the first point. Everybody who lives in this land, everybody who was born here and everybody within the boundaries of the Turkish Republic who is a citizen of this country is a first-class citizen of this country with no distinction being made. Our state is secular. But what holds our nation together, what serves in a most powerful way in our national cohesiveness and what plays the essential role is Islam (Waxman, 2000, p. 17) .
Reference to TIS continues in the 2000s during AKP rule. AKP opposes to idea of being an Islamist party (Yavuz, 2004, p. 227) . Instead, it defines itself as a conservative democracy. This is because of tensions between secular institutions and Islamist parties.
It has never openly presented an anti-Kemalist or anti-laik stance. Rather, it transformed the state:
The AKP flourishes in relation to its political renegotiation of the Kemalist political order through an Islamic resignification of cultural issues. It challenges the authoritarian fundamentals of the state, but without being overtly religious and without shattering the laik foundation of the modernity project (Atasoy, 2009, p. 9) . Armstrong (2012, p. 134) defines it as uniqueness of AKP, and points out wedding of a popular religious nationalism to real political power. The party refers Islam as the cement of nation without making any references to ethnic roots. Abdullah Gül points the party's reference to religion as a common value:
Turkish people have been practicing religion for centuries. Islam has been the cement of this society, which comes from diversified ethnic backgrounds (Gül, 2001 quoted in Çınar and Duran, 2008, p. 33) . (Heper, 2013, p. 151) and Ottoman times are defined as long-awaited period. However, his references throughout 'age of felicity' of Prophet Mohammad and the first four Caliphs are secondary, while primary historical reference point is the Ottoman period, which is perceived as age of peace, tolerance and social harmony (Hale and Özbudun, 2010, p. 152) . The concept of 'New Turkey', which is used to refer to AKP rule, aims to strengthen Turkey as it was in Ottoman times. In an organization in 2015, Erdoğan was welcomed as 'the leader' of 'New Turkey', while "New Turkey Anthem" was performed by an Ottoman military band, which praised Erdoğan. Mentioning historical figures from both Turkish and Islamic periods such as Attila the Hun, Oghuz Han, Alpaslan, the Ottoman Empire's founder Osman Ghazi, Mehmed the Conqueror, Selim I, Suleiman the Magnificent, Abdulhamid II and Atatürk, the band pronounced Erdoğan as one of the leaders (Hürriyet, 2015) . Inspired also from revival of Ottoman times, TIS under AKP rule exists through education.
Educational system is converted for the purpose of creating a pious generation. Making regulations on educational system, role of imam-hatips is strengthened. Quran and Prophet Mohammad's life are put as elective courses to secondary schools (Açıkgöz, 2014, p. 51) . Courses on Arabic and Ottoman language entered to academic programs of schools. Restoration of nation's roots with their past is aimed:
Erdogan argued the lessons were necessary to restore Turks' severed ties with "our roots", with most unable to read the tombstones of their ancestors…It's not a foreign language. It's a form of Turkish that will never age. Therefore it will be taught no matter what they say," he added (Telegraph, 2014) .
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Rather than signifying sovereignty or independence of a nation, banknotes also imply historical narratives that are influential both in the construction of national identities, and, related to this, in implementation of state policies. According to Raento, et al. (2004, p. 930) , the imaginary of money supports the production and maintenance of a (Eligür, 2010, p. 134) . Passion to the glorious periods of Ottoman history and İstanbul's culture, nostalgia to the era of Mehmet II and conquest of İstanbul, admiration to Turkish-Islamic culture and arts were on the peak of glorification (Çetinsaya, 1999, p. 370) . In other words, messages and policies of the ruling elite coincide on designs of banknotes.
7 Of course, these four kinds of banknotes were not the only banknotes issued in E7 Series. I decided on these, because of their connection to topic of this article. Kemaleddin was an Ottoman architect, but also worked during early republican years.
He was one of the pioneers of First National Architectural Movement, which is also called as neo-Ottomanist architecture (Balamir, 2003) . (Tekeli and İlkin, 1997, p. 14) . …what unifies the whole was gone, and thereby the unity was dissolved. Path to be followed is clear: to prepare the future without destroying the 
Conclusion
To conclude, there is a continuity of state-religion relationship in the history of Turkey. Banknotes issued in the early 1980s and 2009, which are subjects of this article, have continuity in terms of TIS. As usage of figures from Ottoman-Turkish and Islamic past demonstrates, symbols and figures issued on these banknotes have direct references to TIS. Although the TCMB defines five criteria on determination of symbols on banknotes in E9 Series, it is debatable. These five criteria are to be a scientist or an artist, to be 'indigenous' i.e. one of our own, to be universally recognized, not to be identified with any political ideology, and not to be issued on previous banknotes both in Turkey and in the world. Adnan Sayılı and Cahit Arf are scientists that were not issued on banknotes before. Thus, their selection makes sense in terms of five criteria of TCMB. As one of the prominent architects in Turkish history, selection of Mimar Kemaleddin can be defined as just that Mimar Sinan has already issued on E7 Banknote Series. However, issuing of Fatma Aliye, Itri and Yunus Emre are controversial in terms of these criteria, one of which was not to be identified with any political ideology.
Fatma Aliye is known for her Islamist ideas. Itri and Yunus Emre are prominent figures of Turkish Islam. It is doubtful that they are used in accordance with political rhetoric of
